SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Democratization of Nepal Army By HK Devkota

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM








Democratization of Nepal Army

By Hari Krishna Devkota





















Submitted to

Nepal Transition To Peace(NTTP) Initiative





Table of Contents

1. Historical Perspective 3

2. The History of Civil-Military Relations 4

3. Current Situation of Civil -Military Relation 5

4. Current Provisions regarding Nepal Army 8

4.1 Constitutional Provision 8

4.2 Comprehensive peace agreement 9

5. Geopolitical Condition and resources 9

5.1 Geo-political condition 9

5.2 Resources 10

6. Promoting Reforms within Nepal Army 11

6.1 Democratization of NA 12

6.2 Restructuring of Nepal Army 13

6.3 Imparting Inclusiveness in NA 13

7. Factors Influencing the Democratization of NA 17

7.1 Current infrastructure 17

7.2 Anti-Maoist Notion 18

7.3 Classical Group 18

7.4 International Community 18

7.5 Civil society 19

7.6 Political Parties 19

8. Conclusion 20

9. References 20





1. Historical Perspective

Nepal unification campaign launched by Prithvi Narayan Shah , was a turning point in the history of the Nepali army. Since unification was not possible without a strong army, the management of the armed forces had to be exceptional. Apart from the standard Malla era temples in Kathmandu, army being organized in Gorkha, technicians and experts had to be brought in from abroad to manufacture war materials. There is the belief that the current Nepal Army is the continuation of army established by Drabya Shah under the command of Bhaghirath Pant in 1616 B.S(Narahari Acharya,2066) After the Gorkhali troops captured Nuwakot, the neighbouring principality of Kathmandu (Kantipur) in the year 1744, the Gorkhali armed forces came to be known as the Royal Nepalese Army. The supremacy of the army under the royal regime shifted to the prime minister during the regime of PM bhimsen thapa. He was the first commander in chief. Then during the regime of Jung Bahadur Rana PM became the Supreme commander of Royal Nepal army. Their gallantry, sincerity and simplicity impressed even their enemy so much that the British East-India Company started recruiting Nepalese into their forces. Since the British had fought against then RNA, which was till that time, still colloquially known as "Army of Gorkha" or "Gorkhali" army, the British called their new soldiers "Gurkhas". The Indian army, after gaining their independence from the British, started calling them "Gorkha". There is still some misunderstanding that the Nepali Army is a part of the British and Indian Armies. The Gurkha Rifles existing in India and Britain are part of foreign military organizations where Nepalis are recruited. The NA are rightfully the true heir of the title of "The original Army of the Gorkha".

With the political change of 2007, the Shah King tried to practize the executive power and then the army again became under the control of the Royal family. Even the first peoples elected government couldn't ammend this provision of nepali army but instead, the people elected prime minister was arrested by the army officilials under the direction of the King Mahendra. During the 30 years of the autocratic panchayat regime (1960- 1990), the military was used to carry out repressive measures against democratic forces and was responsible for disappearances and killings of political party activists. After the restoration of democracy in 1990, the military was, in theory, placed under the National Security Council headed by the Prime Minister. In practice, the King, as the supreme commander of the army continued to exercise authority over military deployment and the daily business of the army through the military secretariat located inside the palace. In principle, Nepal’s military was not created for encounters within the country or for internal affairs, and in fact was not deployed for the first five years of the insurgency launched by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists). The army even often refused to assist in emergency operations to rescue the Nepal Police during the insurgency. During the King’s direct rule (February 2005 – April 2006), the military led the unified command (comprised of the armed police and regular police) and carried out numerous brutal acts of suppression of the democratic movement and killed innocent civilians in the name of eliminating the Maoists throughout the country. The military came to the street to suppress peaceful demonstrations in April 2006 and indiscriminately fired on crowds in different parts of the country that killed at least 21 Nepali citizens and injured more than five thousand peaceful agitators that resulted in hundreds being permanently disabled. Before the nonviolent demonstrations, and even prior to the 2005 coup, the military was responsible for disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and using torture, all on a systematic level.

Prior to 2006 the Nepal Army was known as the Royal Nepalese Army and was under the control of the King of Nepal following the People's Movement for Democracy on May 18, 2006 when a bill was passed by the Nepalese parliament curtailing royal power, this included renaming the army.

2. The History of Civil-Military Relations

For over 240 years, the then Royal Nepalese Army had been controlled by the royal family, operating only in the interest of the monarchy rather than in the interest of Nepali people, nation, democracy, and nationalism. The 104-year, hereditary Rana regime, with the support of this institution (Nepal Army was in fact structured and operated as a family force) had widened the gap between the ruled and ruler. The army was inflicted by the family-centric feudal fixtures such as, nepotism, favoritisms, sycophancy, and so forth. It is generally accepted that the Nepal Army as an institution has never been supported by popular will, which is demonstrated by its behavior during the 1960 royal coup, where it safeguarded King Mahendra’s undemocratic move. The Nepal Army seems to have continued to support every autocratic regime by resisting all Nepalese democratic movements in history. The army also suppressed the popular uprisings in the post-60s period by killing the NC rebels without a trace of remorse.

Interestingly, the Nepal Army, in the federal democratic republic Nepal as well, could not separate itself from its traditional schooling and legacy. During the 30-year Panchayat era (1960-90), the entire security system, including the military, was headed by the king and his courtier’s inner circle. The slogan ‘Rajbhakti, Hamro Shakti’, (loyalty to the king is the power of the army); succinctly encapsulates feudal culture. During the drafting of the constitution in 1990, it implicitly put pressure on the Interim Prime Minister to retain the sovereignty of the people to the king because, for the army, the king remains the solitary representation of the state.. Following tradition, then CoAS, Pyar Jung Thapa, gave a key note speech to the graduate officer cadets at the 11th convocation of the Command-in-Staff College of the then Royal NA on May 14, 2004.

He stated that, “the crown is the symbol of our identity. Moreover, the Kingship is the symbol of progenitor and protector of the Royal Nepal Army along with people’s nationalism and national unity. Therefore, all Nepal’s should be united towards safeguarding the symbol of Nepal’s characteristics along with the fundamentals of our national interests and desire.”

Civil Military Relations (CMR) faces several challenges from the security sector in the (post) armed conflict period. Retired brigadier general Keshar Bahadur Bhandari has said that the issue of civilian supremacy and civil control over the army is high on the agenda. Various armed forces have emerged and the process of militarization has become common. That creates military values which impose themselves on civilian values. Socio-psychologically, armed groups feel superior to the civilian in conflict and post-conflict times. However, the doctrine of civil supremacy states the armed forces should be controlled by, and accountable to, the elected civilian government.

3. Current Situation of Civil -Military Relation

The confrontation between the Prachanda led government and NA was heightened when the Defense Minister refused to forward the file of the eight-Brigadier Generals at the cabinet for their three-year extension of tenure. There has already been a tug-of-war between them, with the Defense Ministry’s refusal of new recruitment initiated by the Army. The retirement of the brigadiers who are assumed to be loyal to the CoAS Katawal from March 15, 2009 onward, weakened his position further. In response he made a strong stand against the PLA’s integration in the Nepal Army or formation of a new National Army on the obvious conspiratorial advice of anti-Maoist forces and traditional mainstream political parties. Thus, the CoAS is directly responsible for his present position in regard to the Government.

Additionally, the NA has challenged the principles of civilian control by ignoring the government’s order to stop the recruitment process. On the other hand, none of the institutions, powerful donor agencies, pillars of civil society, or factions of the government have thought of how to improve the relations between civilian and military institutions. Nepal holds two military forces, the Nepal Army and the Maoist PLA, after signing the Peace Accord and Arms and Armies Management in 2006. There had been repeated promises inside and outside of Nepal’s armed forces to democratize and respect civilian supremacy and human rights, but efforts have repeatedly failed to meet assurances of professionalizing the PLA and democratizing the NA.

The Supreme Court (SC) full-bench ruling on March 9, 2009 not to make additional recruitment in its rank and file has encouraged departmental action against CoAS. However, the court also issued a decision allowing a loophole for the continuation of newly recruited soldier training. There has been heavy pressure to fire the CoAS, even within the military, owing to the deference toward the elected government and their own national identity-based institution. As a result, the Army Chief is trying his best to visit door-to-door to the anti-Maoist leaders to influence them against the present government. If the intensive debate within the NA cannot be resolved soon, there may be a confrontation within the command and even the rank and file (traditional forces vs. reformist forces). That may finally lead to a coup similar to Pakistan, Bangladesh and so forth. As most of the generals of the NA are working not only as a result of their own competency, but from their strong link with the former king, the CoAS influence tapers off vertically down to the rank and file.

The weakness can also been seen on the side of Defense Minister as he could not lose his war-time mind-set against the NA even after the government was formed under his own parties leadership. This can be chalked up to his close association with the PLA.

At that time PM Prachanda himself was surprised to see both external and internal pressure regarding clarification from his own civil servant. He has stated that he has been receiving great pressure against the clarification and possible action against the CoAS from both India and the USA. One of the Minister, publicly stated, “Foreign powers are operating the CoAS Rookmangud Katawal.” He further stated, “The CoAS continued to speak against the peace process with the support from foreign powers.”

The ambiguity between civilian supremacy and military supremacy resides in the space provided by the lack of identification of national interest (external, internal, and timely reform), national security policy, and the extension of NA’s number (45,000 to 95,753 in five years period of insurgency while the NA mobilized against the Maoist People’s War) without any concrete plans, policies, and measures. Still there is not any specific security mechanism charged with the NA’s mobilization, management, and control. To democratize the NA and make it inclusive is yet another major challenge for Nepal.

Despite objections by the UN, the National Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International and other rights bodies, Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal’s government last month promoted Major-General Toran Jung Bahadur Singh to lieutenant-general as well as second in command in the army.

The general has been under fire by human rights bodies as the battalion commanded by him ran a secret torture camp in the heart of the capital during the end of the Maoist insurgency, illegally arresting and torturing suspected Maoists and their sympathisers and extra-judicially executing 49 people, whose bodies have yet not been found.

The UN rights agency in Nepal, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, had conducted an investigation into the disappearances and said it had credible evidence that they vanished from the torture camp run by the battalion headed by Singh. Though the general did not directly take part in the killings, the UN agency said as the head of the troops, he was accountable. Singh’s promotion was challenged by three Maoist leaders, who had been detained in the camp but survived. Chief Justice Anup Raj Sharma himself heard the petition and asked the government to halt the promotion.

In the past, though several controversial army officers have been taken to court and army moves challenged, there has been no result due to the agonisingly slow judicial process in Nepal, especially when the defendants are powerful people.

Nepal’s former army chief, Gen Rookmangud Katawal, was also promoted despite his dark human rights record. Though a petition was filed in court, saying he had presented his false age, it is yet to be resolved even though the general retired last year with full honours.

The Indian Army chief projected himself as anti-Maoist last month when he objected the integration of Maoist combatants’ with the Nepal Army even though Nepal’s political parties had agreed to do it in the comprehensive peace agreement. The statement drew flak from the Maoists, who have accused him of intervening in Nepal’s internal affairs. Human rights groups say the Indian Army’s support for the Nepal Army has prevented army officers from being punished despite of the atrocities they had committed during the Maoists’ “people’s war”.

Lawyer Shree Krishna Subedi who filed the writ in the supreme court against the NA recruitment process was seriously bitten by the unidentified group allegedly related to the personnel of NA on 19th April 2010 shows the recent attitude of NA towards the democratization of NA.(Nepal army, in politics, Politics in Nepal army).

4. Current Provisions Regarding Nepal Army

a. Constitutional Provision

Nepal has changed from a kingdom to the federal Republic. Traditional relations of army with the monarch have to be replaced with the new relationship with the elected and legitimate people's representative. Therefore the constitution of Nepal has clearly spelt the nature of Nepal army. The provision regarding the Nepal army can be summarized as mentioned below.

The president on the recommendation of the Council of ministers shall control, mobilize, and manage the Nepal army in accordance with the law. The council of ministers shall, with the consent of the existing political parties and by seeking the advice of the concerned committee of the legislative parliament, formulate an extensive work plan for the democratization of Nepal Army and implement it. In accord the above mention provision in formulating and implementing the action plan , determination of the appropriate number of Nepal army, its democratic structure and national and inclusive character shall be developed and training shall be imparted to the army in accordance with the norms and values of democracy and human rights.. In order to give the national character and make it inclusive, enlisting of Madhesi, indigenous ethnic groups Dalits women and people from the backward regions into the armed forces on the basis of the principles of equality and inclusiveness shall be assured by law.

The word democratization of the armed forces can be explained in terms of three crucial elements. They are: (a) the relationship between the army and the state, (b) internal organizational values and structure of the army and (c) the link between the army and the general pobulace.

b. Comprehensive Peace Agreement

In a ceremony held at the Birendra International Convention Center in capital Kathmandu on November 21, 2006, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist chairman Prachanda signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 2006.

As per the provision in comprehensive peace agreement the Council of Ministers shall control, mobilize and manage the Nepali Army as per the military Act. The Interim Council of Ministers shall prepare and implement the detailed action plan of the democratization of the Nepali Army by taking suggestions from the concerned committee of the Interim Parliament. This shall include tasks such as determining the right number of the Nepali Army, preparing the democratic structure reflecting the national and inclusive character and training them as per the democratic principles and the values of the human rights.

Nepal Army shall be giving continuity to the tasks such as boarder security, security of the conservation areas, protected areas, banks airports, power house, telephone tower, central secretariat and security of VIPs. The Nepali Army will continue with regular training including live fire exercises. Maintenance and replacement of lethal weapons will take place only with the determination of the interim government or agreement by both parties. Furthermore, the government shall be taking care of the security arrangement of the Maoist leaders.

5. Geopolitical Condition and resources

a. Geo-political Condition

For over a century and a half the geopolitical condition served Nepal's rulers to find their way out of the conflicting demands of two big and powerful neighbours. Subsequently, Nepal continued to adopt a well calibrated 'policy of physical isolation and exclusion of foreigners, coupled with balance of power politics. Notably, Nepal's physical distance from central China and the succession of weak governments there for centuries before 1949, inclined Nepal in the past to think that India's interference and intervention in Nepal's affairs was a greater probability than China's. Emphasizing geo-political realities King Birendra proposed to declare Nepal as a Zone of Peace (ZOP) in 1973. Furthermore future equation between Nepal and its closest neighbors- India and China largely depends on how the Tibet issue is handled, and the economy. As long as Nepal agrees to deal with anti China elements in the country and to control the flow of Tibetan refugees into the country; Beijing will act favorably towards Kathmandu. China has already doubled its economic aid package to Nepal and more good news might follow. India is also finally ready to listen to Nepal's concerns and work on bilateral issues. Nepal is in a position to get the best from its two neighbors, but the deteriorating law and order situation in the country and political turmoil could spoil the opportunity (Nath and Acharya 1987). With the security situation extremely fluid, external forces' interest and activities opaque, or dubious, it is impossible to say what's next.

b. Resources

The resources for Nepal army are much more less than that of the giant neighbour. The active troops for India is 1.5 million where as that of china is 3 million which are far more than the 0.1 million troops of Nepal army. Furthermore, India spends $32 billion and china $78.25 billion as their defense budget but total budget for Nepal for the year 2009/2010 was only $3.81 billion. This situation also directs the Nepal's relationship with the neighbors. The total strength of Nepal army according to the Comprehensive Peace accord is 91444 personnel. Nepal's military resources can be compared with that of its neighbors and will be supportive in its national security strategy.

.Indian Army statistics

Active Troops

1,414,000

Reserve Troops

1,800,000

Indian Territorial Army

787,000

Main battle tanks

5,000

Artillery

3,200

Ballistic missiles

~100 (Agni-I, Agni-II, Agni-III) Dhanus : ShipLBM


Ballistic missiles

~1,000 Prithvi missile series,Sagarika : SLBM,Shaurava : MRBM, Dhanush: ShipLBM (Quasi-ballistic missile)Dhanush: ShipLBMMRBM,(Quasi-ballistic missile)

• Shaurya: MRBM (Quasi-ballistic missile)

• Dhanush: ShipLBM



Cruise missiles

~1,000 BrahMos


Aircraft

~1,500

Surface-to-air missiles

100,000



On the other hand, China has six types of operational land based nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, the DF-3A, DF-4, DF-5/5A, DF-11, DF-15, and the DF-21/21X. China flight tested the DF-31 in August 1999, but it is unknown if it has been deployed. A longer range road mobile ballistic missile, the DF-41, is also being developed, but has not been flight tested. China has only one type of operational submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Julang-1. Twelve Julang-1 are deployed on China's single Xia-class ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN). The warheads for the Julang-1 are believed to be stored at the Jianggezhuang Submarine Base. China is developing a longer range SLBM known as the JL-2 which is the sea-based version of the DF-31. The JL-2 has not yet been tested from any submarines.

Chinese Army statistics

Active Troops 2,255,000

Reserve Troops

800,000

Active paramilitary units

3,969,000

Total Land Based weapons 31,300

Tanks

8,200

Towed Artillery

14,000

Ballistic missiles (Currently deployed)

DF9(Dong Feng) 3/3A, DF4,DF5/5A,DF11, DF21,JL(Julang)121: ASBM (anti ballastic missile),DF-25: IRBM,DF-31: ICBMDF-41ICBM,JL-1: SLBM IRBM,JL-2: SLBM ICBM,B-611: SRBM,P-21: TBM SSM



Aircrafts and helicopters

1,900 +491

6. Promoting Reforms within Nepal Army

The types, sizes, number, equipments are directly related to the country’s security threat perception against their national interests. Defining core values, identifying National Interests and developing a ‘National Security Strategy’ after evaluating threats should be done by people's representatives in consultation with the security experts and the members of security forces. Civilians direct their nation's military and decide issues of national defence not because they are necessarily wiser than military professionals, but precisely because they are the people's representatives, they are charged with the responsibility for making these decisions and remaining accountable for them. Army performs only to support National Security Strategy.

In democracies, questions of peace and war or other threats to national security are the most important issues a society faces, and thus must be decided by the people, acting through their elected representatives. A democratic military serves its nation rather than leads it. Military leaders can advise, but the decisions made by the elected leaders must be carried out. Only those who are elected by the people have the final authority and the responsibility to decide the fate of a nation. This idea of civilian control and authority over the military is thus, fundamental to democracy.

In democratic countries not only the supreme-commander-in-Chief, but also the system should be such that there is check and balances in every level of operations from civilian, bureaucracy to security forces level. This necessitates the involvement of various organizations and committees like State Affairs Committee, Cabinet Committee of National Security, Parliamentary Standing Committee on defence, National Security Council, Ministry of Defence, National Defence Committee etc.

a. Democratization of Nepal Army

The democratic education and attitude of the armed force needs to be promoted so that the military can be properly integrated in the society and not pose a threat to the democracy. In accord with the provision of the interim provision regarding NA, formulating and implementing the action plan , determination of the appropriate number of Nepal army, its democratic structure and national and inclusive character shall be developed and training shall be imparted to the army in accordance with the norms and values of democracy and human rights.

The democratic governance is a central element of security sector restructuring. The following elements that can be helpful in enhancing the democratic disposition of uniformed personnel:

• Allegiance to the constitution and state institution.

• Security sector as the mirror of the Society.

• Legalizing disobedience to illegal and abusive orders

• Promoting education in key values and norms to the military personnel.

• Establishing the criteria for the appointment of top security personnel.

• A well defined internal order of the security sector. The reason of state establishes that its legitimate monopoly on power is prerequisite to defend the citizens from external threat and performance governance functions.

• Providing the political neutrality and non active involvement to the security forces. Professionalism of security agencies on public affairs and parliament and government on security matters are crucial to build mutual confidence.

• Civilians in Top security management Modern democracy requires the primacy of civilian control (elected parliament and government) over security components especially on matters of security expenditure, the disposition of structure, control over internal promotions, the kind of military technology to be acquired, purchase of equipments, military tasks, doctrine and security strategy.

• Institutionalization of civil-security relations is important for coherence and synergy of the tasks and prevent the rise of militarism occurring at societal (armed groups, militant youth wings and radicalism in political party) levels.

• A project of civic education (enlightenment) is essential to provide exposure and constructive engagement of all the stakeholders on the principles and practice of national security, democracy, human rights, constitutionalism and rights and responsibilities of citizens so that they develop cultivated capacity to take effective

b. Restructuring of Nepal Army

The Comprehensive Peace Accord and Interim Constitution states about redefining the size of Nepal Army. The actual size of Nepal army depends upon the several factors such as long term national security policy, international power relation and Nepal's position, economic feasibility of the state, possibility of mobilizing alternative security arrangement areas of engagement, the current geopolitical condition and several other factors. For resizing the Nepal army the options may be upsizing, downsizing or maintaining the current situation. In addition, according the comprehensive Peace Accord and interim constitution the PLA should also be addressed which may also determine the resizing of NA and it's restructuring.

Though there is not a strong voice regarding the upsizing of the army, the voices regarding the downsizing and maintaining the existing strength are prominent. The proponents of the keeping the existing strength argue that reducing the existing strength may cause imbalance in command, needs deterrence in case of unexpected external interference, serious problems in nature conservation, affects the development works by Nepal army, alters the contribution in UN peace keeping mission, in disaster management in the the security of V/VIP, during internal conflicts, in the security of the tasks currently allocated to the NA.

But the proponents for the downsizing the NA argue that during the Maoist insurgency the size has been doubled which is much more expensive to the poor country. Furthermore, they argue that the engagement in palace security, parks and reserves security should be terminated and should be handed over to Nepal police. Nepal geopolitical condition reflects that it cannot confront or compete to the giant neighbour. In the case if deterrence is needed every Nepalese citizens should be trained.

c. Imparting Inclusiveness in NA

According to the provision of the provision of the interim constitution the NA should reflect the inclusive character. In order to give the national character and make it inclusive, enlisting of Madhesi, indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, women and people from the backward regions into the armed forces on the basis of the principles of equality and inclusiveness shall be assured by law. The present situation shows the CoAS Chhatra Man Singh Gurung to be the first army personnel to be the Chief which is a key success in imparting inclusiveness in Nepal Army. The current inclusiveness status of Nepal army can be observed from the table below.

Table: State of Castes / Ethnic Inclusion in Nepalese Army (As of July 30, 2008)

S. No.



(A) Caste / Ethnic Groups



(B) Population

(2001 census)

(C) % of Total

Population

(D) Representation

in NA

(E) % of Total

Representation

(F)

1. Chhetri 3,593,496 15.80 37,762 41.85

2. Brahmins 2,896,477 12.74 8,979 9.95

3. Magar 1,622,421 7.14 8,696 9.63

4. Tamang 1,282,304 5.64 5397 5.98

5. Newar 1,245,232 5.48 5,981 6.62

6. Kami 895,954 3.94 2,435 2.69

7. Rai 635,151 2.79 2,562 2.83

8. Gurung 543,571 2.39 3,053 3.38

9. Dhamai/Dholi/ Gandharba 390,305 1.72 1,909 2.11

11. Limbu 359,379 1.58 952 1.05

12. Thakuri 334,120 1.47 3,358 3.72

13. Sarki 318,989 1.40 943 1.04

14. Gharti/Bhujel 117,568 0.52 645 0.71

15. Sanyasi 199,127 0.88 924 1.02

16. Kumal 99,389 0.44 461 0.51

17. Thakali

Sherpa 12,973

16,7585 0.06

0.68 139 0.15

18. Tharu

Rajbansi 1,533,879

95,812 6.75

0.42 4,765 5.28

19. Dusad/Paswan/Pasi 158,525 0.70 34 0.03

20. Teli 304,536 1.34 14 0.01

21. Hajam/Takur 98,169 0.43 437 0.48

22. Muslim 971,056 4.27 26 0.02

23. Mechhe 3,763 0.02 47 0.05

24. Raji 2399 0.01 12 0.01

25. Majhi 72,614 0.31 305 0.33

26. Darai 14,859 0.07 142 0.15

27. Danuwar 53,229 0.23 116 0.12

28. Jirel 5,316 0.02 61 0.06

29. Thami 22,999 0.10 62 0.06

30. Chepang 52,237 0.23 25 0.02

31. Pahari 11,505 0.05 24 0.02

32. Rajdhob, Pela 8

Total 90,226 100

Source: Wikipedia

Among various castes and ethnic communities Chhetris seem to have domination in the military. Magars, Newars, Rais, Gurungs, Damais/Dholis, Ghartis/Bhujels, Thakuris, Sanaysis, Kumals, Hajams/Thakurs, Darais and Jirels are also slightly over represented compared to their respective population ratio. But Brahmins, Tamangs, Kamis, Limbus, Sarkis, and Tharus are slightly under represented. Various Madhesi castes (Serial number 18-25) make 14.25 % of total population (Excluding 134, 496 Terai- Brahmin population which make 0.59% of total population. Currently in NA statistics, they are seemingly mixed with Brahmins of the Hills ) where as only 6.26 percent are seemingly serving in the army. The recruitment record of Nepal army shows the cause for this lesser degree of inclusion seems to be the lack of interest on the part of Madhesi communities to join military services.

In the decision making level out of 18 posts including two technical, in the rank of Major General and above, the current representations (as of July 2008) are- 8 Chhetri, 2 Limbu, 2 Brahmin, 2 Gurung, 2 Thakuri, 1 Rana, and 1 Newar. These figures differ after every case of retirements / promotions. Even in the times of the unification of Nepal, Jayantha Rana, an ethnic Magar, was one of the most successful commanders of King Prithivi Narayan Shah.



The voices have been heard that the discrimination based on ethnicity exists on recruitment in NA for the post of sipahi. To find a realistic picture NA had compared the statistics of aspirants of various castes and ethnic communities from those who had registered their name to join the NA in January 2008 in Dhading, Patan, Sarlahi, Dang, and Okhaldhunga recruitment centers below. Out of 15,825 applicants only 1,683 (10.6%) Madhesi and 835 (5.3%) Dalits have shown their interest to join NA. Applicants from Brahmin Chhetri and Janajati groups topped the figure by 53.3% and 30.9% respectively. The summary of aspirants during the recruitment process can be summarized as in the table below.

Table: Comparison of Candidates Applied For the Post of Sipahi and Followers

S.No. Recruitment Center Brahmin,

Chhetri Janajati/ Indigenous

Community Dalits Madhesi,

Tharu Total

1. Dhading, Baireni 294 280 141 53 768

2. Sarlahi, Nawalpur 764 468 48 289 1569

3. Patan, Lagankhel 4240 2768 258 273 7539

4. Dang, Tulsipur 294 473 152 534 2462

5. Okhaldhunga 531 410 84 0 1025

6. Dang 1303 473 152 534 2462

Total 8,435 4,872 835 1683 15,825

Percentage 53.3 30.9 5.3 10.6



Source: From various recruitment centres of NA.

Application for recruitment of S. No. 50 Officer Cadet (to be commissioned as 2/Lt after training) was called by Recruitment Selection Directorate in Army HQ by November 2007/08. Total of 4,993 male youths from all five development regions and 75 districts applied for the post. Status of representation from various castes / ethnic groups and region are shown on table below:

Table: Aspirants for Officer Cadet on Casts / Ethnic and Regional Basis

S.No Development Regions Brahmin

Chhetri Janajati, Indigenous

Community Dalits Madhesi

Tharu Total %

1. Eastern 411 168 9 14 602 12.05

2. Central 2056 701 56 35 2848 57.03

3. Western 651 197 28 10 886 17.75

4. Mid Western 286 37 14 14 351 7.02

5. Far Western 279 21 3 3 306 6.15

Total Applicants 3683 1124 110 76 4993

Percentage 73.8 22.5 2.7 1.5



Source: AG Dept (Recruitment Selection), Nepalese Army HQ.



Out of 4993 aspirants for the post of Officer Cadet (2/Lt) 3,683 (73.76%) applicants belong to Brahmin / Chhetri community, 1,124 (22.51%) belong to Janajati / Indigenous community, 110 (2.7 %) belong to Dalit community, and 76 (1.5 %) belong to Madhesi community. From the perspective of geographical representation, more than 50% applicants come from Central Development Region. From Far Western Development Region about 7% aspirants registered their name. A balanced education policy is needed to increase probability of proportional representation to all ethnic groups and regions since all the candidate have the equal probability of being selected as per the recruitment policy of Government of Nepal and Nepal army.

TAble: Comparative Result of IQ and Written Exams for Officer Cadet

S.No Brahmin, Chhetri Janajati/Indigenous Community Dalits Madhesi, Tharu Total

1. Number of Applicants 3683 1124 110 96 4993

Percentage 73.8 22.5 2.7 1.5

2. Passed in IQ Test 1267 327 19 16 1629

Percentage 77.77 20.07 1.16 0.98

3. Passed in Written Exams 312 46 5 2 365

Percentage 85.47 12.60 1.36 0.54



Source: AG Dept (Recruit Selection).

Applicants for Officer cadets undergo various exams before they finally get selected. Generally, it is found that bulk of the applicants normally fail in the written tests. The table above depicts that success ratio of Brahmin and Clhetris community in written tests are relatively higher i.e., 85.47 percent. Whereas success rate of Madhesis, Tharus, Dalits and Janajati communities are quite less with 0.54, 1.36 and 12.60 percent respectively. The latter three communities are relatively weaker in written reflects the weakness of education system in those regions where these community reside.

In Nepal different castes and ethnic groups have different motivation for their employment. Furthermore, the major obstacle for inclusiveness arise from the interest of the ethnic group also as for example more members of Madeshi community prefer to join Nepal police rather than Nepal Army.

7. Factors Influencing the Democratization of Nepal Army

Therefore during the process of democratization of security forces apart from the above mention necessary factors there are various other hurdles that play their role in the democratization of Nepal Army can be listed in the following points.

a. Current Infrastructure

At the time of monarchy the palace had direct control over the Nepal Army. It had an institution called Principal Military Secretariat through which the security forces were managed. The ministry of defence was very small and managed by the non-professionals. Invariably, the Prime minister himself headed it. After the Jana-andolan of 1989, the constitutional monarchical system was established. Thereafter National Security Council (NSC) was introduced whose president was the PM and the members were the Defence, Home and Finance ministers. Nepal Army, Armed Police, Nepal Police and National Investigation Department officials filled the NSC secretariat. Even after the establishment federal republic, the secretariat is under the civilian control but the working procedure had not changed much from that of monarchical system. The civilian leadership showed reluctance to bring much change in the entire management system of the Armed Forces especially in the Nepal Army. And lack of proper coordination between the civilian leadership and the army leadership is the major hurdle in its democratization.

b. Anti-Maoist Notion

During the period of insurgency the Nepal Army was boosted with the anti-maoist notion. But the situation of insurgency and the present transition to peace is different. After the CA election the rebellion has become the largest party among all and this position of the former alleged enemies might be the headache for the Nepal army which were trained to be anti-maoist. Further, the issue raised by the Maoist led government about the civilian supremacy versus military supremacy has heightened the anti-maoist notion of the NA. There are several schools of thought in the anti-Maoist notion. Better performance in some of the field by Former government led by Maoist was headache for the infamous leaders which further imparted the anti-maoist notion. People centric work by the government means their political carriers would be doomed. The Maoists shall impose an authoritarian regime, controlling the big house media, judiciary, and Nepal Army. The infamous leaders have fears that they shall be punished on charges of corruption if the government prevails in the country. These notions compelled them to get behind the NA and prop it up as a shield.

c. Classical Group

Among various forces in this diverse community there may be several semi-feudal, semi-imperial, and semi-colonial forces have had fertile time to advance their vested interest in the security forces especially the Nepal Army which is the stable and static power of the country. These forces are against inclusive democracy, people’s livelihood, freedom, and free-market economy. Destabilizing the state means grasping the opportunity to continue their extended privileges as in the past. These groups are seeking their own benefits by taking advantage of the internal conflicts in the Maoists party and even between two parties of the peace process and Nepal Army.

d. International Community

From India's point of view it understands that if Nepal were out of control, it would eventually affect the security system of India. India tends to minimize the role of Pakistani fundamentalists as a coping strategy for the communist problems in its home territory. Many European communities are trying to take the middle path by saying that the dispute is an internal matter and Nepal is to be a sovereign and independent country with full integrity. Due to the protracted history of the USA being against communist regimes, it wants to crush communist ideology using all available means. Owing to geo-political interest (as Nepal is in between India and China), the USA seeks a greater role in destabilizing Nepal’s regime for its hegemonic encroachment in both the emerging super powers of the modern world. A tiny minority of nations have an interest in preserving a colonial legacy in Nepal. Such forces are formally and informally supporting militarily supremacy. Furthermore, China is even in favour of the well established and static power in Nepal for its internal security. Therefore, the diverse interest of the international community has created a hurdle in democratization of NA despite the will of civilians.

e. Civil Society

The members in the civil society represent from different thoughts and even from different political background in the past. There are several divisive thoughts spreading through civil society. Furthermore, those members who are empowered by the donor communities obviously tend to work as spokespersons for their donor. Those who are seeking power are segregated under the umbrella of political parties. A very few are working independently for the sake of people, nation, democracy, and nationalism but they are in minority and are voiceless. The selfish interest groups are now happy to please their lords by informally supporting or undermining the army as per their interest in the fragile transition of Nepal politics.

f. Political Parties

The mainstream political parties (old parliamentarian parties), after the establishment of republic state and the Constituent Assembly election, are feeling themselves handicapped due to the position of UCPN Maoist in the CA. They are seeking assistance from the Nepal Army to compete with UCPN Maoist. This prevailing condition supports the NA to follow the previous classical trends of monarchy and is hindering in the path of democratization within the organization. To plead the Nepal Army they political parties are skiping and hiding the abuse by the army personnel. As for example, the defence minister Bidya Bhandari was constantly lobbing for the promotion of army general Toran Jung Bahadur Singh to Lieutenant General despite of the fact that he was accused of human right abuse by OHCHR. The similar case was with Major Niranjan Basnet who was accused of the murder of Maina Sunuwar in Kavre District. Furthermore, these political parties are actively involved in boosting the anti maoist notion to the organization. The willingness of the political parties, to handle the Nepal Army as per their interest as the monarch used to, is the major obstacle towards the democratization of Nepal Army.

8. Conclusion

Since from the establishment of the Nepal Army, it has been trained as the army of the royal family and not for the civilians. This notion still prevails within the organization. The internal structure of the Nepal army is similar to that of the British and Indian army module despite of its different geopolitical condition. Thus, there is a need for reform within in organization.

The preliminary step in reform is the democratization of NA by: its allegiance to constitution and state institution, legalizing disobedience to illegal and abusive orders, establishing well defined criteria for appointment of top security personal, maintaining internal order and political neutrality, imparting professionalism, civic education, civilian control and institutionalization of civil-security relation.

The restructuring and resizing of Nepal Army is essential as per the geopolitical condition, and available resources and responsibility. Imparting inclusiveness as per the constitutional provision and comprehensive peace agreement is one of the most essential factors for security sector reform. The balanced educational policy throughout the country for imparting professionalism along with inclusiveness is needed as the statistics of the recruitment process shows the default in education system among the ethnic groups on regional basis. Furthermore, the willingness of members of different ethnic groups towards diverse profession also creates difficulties in inclusiveness.

Though many steps towards the reform of NA have been taken in terms of inclusiveness, restructuring and democratization, the pace could not cope with the present need of democracy and civilian supremacy. The obstacles towards democratization such as anti-maoist notion, classical group, international community, civil society and political parties, need to be overcome by the independent team of experts for formulating the plans and policies for the reforming of NA.

9. References

• The interim constitution of Nepal, 2063 (2007).

• Josse M.R. Nepal's strategic balancing, South Asian Journal January to March 2004.

• Chandrasekharan S. 2006 NEPAL: Historic Peace Agreement Signed- but some problems continue-South Asian Analysis group.

• Acharya N. 2066 Nepali Sena Nepali surakchya chhetra: ek sangraha (ed)Bishnu Sapkota p 149-168.

• Yogi Narahari Nath and Babu Ram Acharya (eds.), (1978) 'Rastrapita Shri Panch Bada Maharaj Prithivinarayan Shah ko Divyopadesh', in Nepali Politics: Retrospect and Prospect Oxford University Press, p. 104.

• Born et al, 2003, Parliamentary oversight of the security sector, Principles, mechanisms and practices, Geneva Centre for the democratic control of armed forces.



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