The World Is Changing Faster Than We Think Ten geopolitical predictions for 2026–2030—and what they mean for Nepal By Senior Advocate Dr. Khimlal Devkota

There is a moment in history when yesterday's assumptions become today's liabilities. We may be approaching such a moment. For three decades after the Cold War, the world operated under a remarkably powerful assumption: The United States would remain the principal organizer of international politics, the dollar would remain the indispensable currency of global commerce, Western institutions would set the rules, and military alliances led by Washington would provide the principal architecture of international security.

That order is not disappearing overnight. But it is being challenged—simultaneously—from several directions. Venezuela has just entered a sweeping oil arrangement with Washington that gives U.S. interests majority control over access to more than 65 billion barrels of proven Venezuelan reserves. Canada is deepening defense and economic relations with the European Union. Russia has tested a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile only days after a surprise Moscow visit by CIA Director John Ratcliffe.

The BRICS countries are discussing cross-border payment systems, local currencies and central-bank digital currencies. Meanwhile, the U.S. dollar remains dominant, but countries increasingly want alternatives to dependence on a single financial system. (Reuters). None of these developments, taken alone, means that the United States is "collapsing." But taken together, they tell us something more important: The architecture of global power is being renegotiated.

The great geopolitical story of 2026–2030 may therefore not be the collapse of American power. It may be the end of the period in which American power could operate as the world's unquestioned organising principle. The world is moving—not neatly or peacefully—from unipolarity toward contested multipolarity. And for a small country such as Nepal, this transformation is not a distant academic issue. It may determine the choices available to us for the next generation.

1.           The Venezuelan Oil Deal: Sovereignty Meets Strategic Resources
The latest U.S.–Venezuela oil agreement is perhaps the clearest illustration of the return of resource geopolitics. President Donald Trump has announced an arrangement giving U.S. interests majority control over access to more than 65 billion barrels of Venezuelan proven oil reserves. The proposed arrangement is expected to involve massive American investment and the redevelopment of Venezuela's damaged petroleum infrastructure. Venezuela's interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, describes the arrangement as a long-term partnership designed to attract capital and technology while maintaining Venezuelan sovereignty over natural resources. (Reuters)
The dispute over how to describe this arrangement is revealing in itself. Is this economic cooperation? Is it resource diplomacy? Is it strategic dependency? Or is it a new form of resource-based geopolitical bargaining? The answer may be: all four. The Venezuelan case reminds us that the geopolitics of the twenty-first century will not be fought only over territory. It will increasingly be fought over oil, gas, lithium, rare earths, water, food, semiconductors, data and artificial intelligence. The country that controls strategic resources—or controls access to them—possesses geopolitical leverage.

2.           Canada Is Not Joining the EU—but Its Strategic Direction Matters
One should be careful with the claim that Canada is "joining the EU."It is not. Canada is not an EU member and has not begun a conventional accession process. But something strategically significant has nevertheless occurred. In June 2026, the EU formally concluded an agreement allowing Canadian companies to participate in the EU's Security Action for Europe (SAFE) defence procurement programme. Canada is the first non-European country to participate in SAFE. (Consilium). This is more than a defence contract. It is evidence of strategic diversification. Canada has historically been economically and militarily intertwined with the United States. Yet the recent deterioration in U.S.–Canada relations, including tariffs and disputes over sovereignty and trade, has encouraged Ottawa to look for alternative markets and strategic partnerships. (Reuters). The irony is striking. Britain left the European Union. Canada, thousands of kilometres away, is moving closer to European defence structures.This tells us something about the emerging order: geopolitical relationships are increasingly determined not simply by geography, but by shared interests, supply chains, security needs, technology and strategic autonomy.

3.           The Falklands Question Shows How Alliances Can Become Transactional
The Falklands/Malvinas dispute is another warning sign. Recent reports suggest that Washington may reconsider elements of its traditional position on British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The reporting does not establish that President Trump has threatened to seize the islands. Rather, it indicates the possibility of a reassessment of longstanding U.S. diplomatic support for Britain's position. The British government has responded by reaffirming that the islands "are and will remain" a British Overseas Territory in accordance with the wishes of the islanders. (Reuters). The larger significance lies elsewhere. For decades, Western alliances were built upon the assumption that members shared certain strategic commitments almost automatically. The emerging model may be different. Alliances may increasingly become transactional. Countries will ask: "What do you contribute?" "What do I receive?" "Are you protecting my interests?" "What is the cost of supporting you?" That represents a profound change in the psychology of international relations.

4.           Russia and Nuclear Signalling: Deterrence Is Back:The surprise visit of CIA Director John Ratcliffe to Moscow was followed by Russia's test of a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile test should not be described as a nuclear explosion. It was a test of a nuclear-capable delivery system. But the strategic message is nevertheless serious. Ratcliffe's visit itself was reportedly connected to concerns about Russian intentions and efforts to communicate directly with Moscow. The precise details remain partly classified and contested. (The Wall Street Journal) The lesson is unmistakable: Nuclear deterrence has returned to the centre of great-power politics. During the optimistic years following the Cold War, many believed that economic interdependence would gradually reduce the importance of nuclear weapons. The opposite has happened. Russia, the United States and China continue to modernise their nuclear arsenals. Meanwhile, arms-control arrangements have weakened and strategic mistrust has increased.The nuclear weapon in the twenty-first century is not merely a weapon of destruction. It is a weapon of deterrence, signalling, bargaining and psychological pressure.

5.           BRICS Will Become More Important—But It Will Not Replace the West Overnight
The BRICS story is often exaggerated in both directions. Some claim BRICS is about to destroy the Western financial system. Others dismiss BRICS as a talking shop. Both views are inadequate. BRICS is becoming important precisely because it provides a platform through which major non-Western powers can coordinate without creating a conventional military alliance. India's 2026 BRICS agenda includes stronger financial cooperation, while BRICS central banks are discussing ways to connect payment systems and central-bank digital currencies. (Reuters). The direction is significant. BRICS countries are increasingly interested in: local-currency settlement; alternative payment systems; cross-border digital payments; central-bank digital currencies; local-currency financing; New Development Bank financing; and reduced dependence on Western financial infrastructure. The objective, however, should not be described simply as "destroying the dollar." A more accurate description is: building options beyond the dollar. That distinction is critical.

6.           The Dollar Will Survive—But Dollar Dominance Will Gradually Decline
The most dangerous analytical mistake would be to predict an imminent collapse of the U.S. dollar. The evidence does not support it. The IMF reports that the U.S. dollar accounted for 57.13 percent of global official foreign-exchange reserves in the first quarter of 2026, up from 56.42 percent in the previous quarter. (IMF Data). The dollar remains deeply embedded in global finance, trade, foreign-exchange markets and international debt. There is also no single currency ready to replace it.The euro has institutional limitations. The renminbi remains constrained by China's capital-account and financial-system arrangements. The yen and pound are important but cannot replace the dollar at global scale.

7.           Gold is increasingly attractive as a reserve asset but cannot easily perform all the functions of a modern international currency. So the most likely future is not: Dollar → zero, It is:Dollar dominance → monetary diversification. The world may increasingly operate through a portfolio of currencies.
That would be a significant geopolitical transformation even if the dollar remained the world's single most important currency.

8.           Ten Geopolitical Predictions for 2026–2030:

Prediction1: The world will become genuinely multipolar: By 2030, the United States will remain a superpower, but China, India, the European Union and other major powers will possess greater capacity to pursue independent strategies. The era of one dominant geopolitical centre will gradually give way to several centres.

Prediction 2: BRICS will become an institutional ecosystem, not a military alliance: BRICS is unlikely to become "NATO of the Global South." Instead, it will become an ecosystem involving: finance + development + trade + payment systems + technology + energy + diplomacy. Its greatest impact may therefore come from institutions rather than ideology.

Prediction 3: De-dollarisation will be gradual, not revolutionary: The dollar will remain dominant through 2030. But more bilateral trade will be settled in national currencies, and alternative payment systems will expand. The objective of many countries will not be to abandon the dollar completely. It will be to avoid being dependent upon it.

Prediction 4: Strategic resources will become the new geopolitical currency: Oil will remain important, but the strategic resource map will expand. Expect growing competition over: lithium; cobalt; copper; rare earths; uranium; natural gas; water; food; semiconductors; and critical minerals.Venezuela is therefore not an isolated story. It is a preview.

Prediction 5: Economic security will replace free trade as the dominant doctrine: The old question was: "Where can we buy most cheaply?" The new question is: "Where can we buy safely?" Countries will increasingly accept higher costs in exchange for secure supply chains. "Efficiency" will increasingly compete with "resilience."

Prediction 6: Artificial intelligence will become a geopolitical asset: AI will become comparable to energy, nuclear technology and telecommunications in strategic importance. Countries that control advanced computing, semiconductor supply chains, data, models and AI talent will possess significant geopolitical leverage. For smaller countries, technological sovereignty will not necessarily mean building everything domestically. It will mean ensuring secure access, national capacity and strategic. autonomy.

Prediction 7: Middle powers will become more influential: Canada, Australia, Türkiye, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, South Africa and others will increasingly exercise "multi-alignment." They will cooperate with Washington on one issue, Beijing on another, Brussels on a third and regional powers on a fourth. This will weaken the old assumption that every country must permanently belong to one geopolitical camp.

Prediction 8: Europe will pursue greater strategic autonomy: Europe's security dependence on the United States is being reassessed.
The Canada–EU SAFE arrangement is an early indication that European defence cooperation is becoming more outward-looking. (Consilium) By 2030, Europe may possess substantially greater independent defence-industrial capacity.

Prediction 9: Nuclear deterrence will remain central: The Ukraine war and growing U.S.–China rivalry will ensure that nuclear weapons remain central to strategic calculations. The risk may not be deliberate nuclear war. The greater danger may be: miscalculation + escalation + cyberwar + AI + conventional conflict.

Prediction 10: Sovereignty will increasingly mean economic sovereignty: The nineteenth century defined sovereignty mainly through territory. The twentieth century added military security. The twenty-first century is adding: energy sovereignty + food sovereignty + financial sovereignty + technological sovereignty + data sovereignty. A country may possess a flag, parliament and constitution but remain strategically vulnerable if it cannot control its critical economic systems.

9. What Does All This Mean for Nepal?

For Nepal, this changing world should produce neither panic nor ideological alignment. It should produce strategic thinking. Nepal occupies one of the world's most sensitive geopolitical locations. We are situated between India and China—two countries whose importance will increase substantially during the next decade. At the same time, Nepal has historic relationships with the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia and multilateral institutions. The wrong response would be to choose one side. The better response is strategic autonomy. Nepal needs a foreign policy that is: principled but pragmatic; independent but not isolated; balanced but not indecisive; national-interest driven but internationally responsible.

10. Nepal's Seven Strategic Priorities

First: Protect strategic resources: Nepal's water, hydropower, biodiversity, minerals and land should be managed as strategic national assets. Hydropower should not merely generate electricity. It should generate geopolitical leverage, export revenue and economic independence.

Second: Diversify trade: Nepal should reduce excessive dependence on any single market. India will remain Nepal's most important economic partner. China will remain strategically indispensable. But Nepal should simultaneously expand relations with Europe, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, the Gulf and other markets.

Third: Build financial resilience: The debate about de-dollarisation should not lead Nepal into speculative monetary experiments. Instead, Nepal should strengthen: foreign-exchange reserves; export capacity; remittance sustainability; domestic production; digital payment infrastructure; and diversified external financing.

Fourth: Develop technological sovereignty: Nepal cannot compete by attempting to manufacture everything. But Nepal can ensure: data protection + cybersecurity + AI literacy + digital infrastructure + skilled human resources.

Fifth: Use multilateralism strategically: Nepal should strengthen its role in the UN, WTO, BIMSTEC, SAARC and other multilateral institutions. A small country becomes stronger when international law becomes stronger.

Sixth: Avoid great-power dependency: Nepal should welcome investment from all partners—but should not allow investment to become political control. The principle should be simple: Investment is welcome; dependency is not.

Seventh: Make federalism part of geopolitical resilience: Nepal's federal system should not be viewed merely as an administrative arrangement.
Provincial and local governments can contribute directly to: disaster resilience; water management; energy development; tourism; border-region development; local economic diplomacy; and social cohesion. A strong centre with weak provinces is not enough. Nepal needs resilience from the village to the federal level.

11. Conclusion:  Nepal Must Prepare for the World That Is Coming

The biggest geopolitical mistake is to assume that tomorrow will resemble yesterday.
It will not. The United States will remain powerful. China will remain a rising superpower. India will become increasingly influential. Europe will seek greater strategic autonomy. Russia will remain a major military power. BRICS will become more institutionally significant. The dollar will remain dominant but face greater competition. Strategic resources will become more valuable. Artificial intelligence will reshape economic and military power. And middle powers will increasingly refuse to choose permanent camps.

The world of 2030 will therefore not necessarily be an "anti-American" world. It will be a world in which American power is one powerful pole among several.
That is a fundamentally different international system. The Venezuelan oil agreement, the Canada–EU defence relationship, the Russia–NATO confrontation, the BRICS financial agenda and the gradual diversification of global reserves should therefore not be read as disconnected events.They are pieces of a larger puzzle. The puzzle is the reconstruction of the international order. And the crucial question for Nepal is not: "Will America collapse?" Nor: "Will China replace America?" Nor: "Should Nepal join one camp?" The more intelligent question is: How can Nepal remain sovereign, prosperous and strategically autonomous when no single power can dominate the world?
That is the foreign-policy question of our generation. The answer will require neither anti-Americanism nor anti-Chinese sentiment. It will require something more difficult: a foreign policy based on national interest, constitutional principles, international law, economic resilience, strategic autonomy and intelligent multi-alignment. The coming decade will belong not necessarily to the largest countries, but to the countries that can navigate the competition among the largest countries without losing their own strategic direction. For Nepal, that is not merely a diplomatic challenge. It is a question of national survival, sovereignty and statecraft.

Selected references

International Monetary Fund, Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), Q1 2026 — the dollar accounted for 57.13% of allocated reserves.

Council of the European Union, SAFE: Council concludes agreement with Canada, 15 June 2026 — Canada became the first non-European country to participate in SAFE.

Reuters, U.S. enters into oil agreement with Venezuela, Trump says, 28 August 2026.

Reuters, BRICS nations discuss linking payment systems and CBDCs, August 2026.

Reuters, China's Xi likely to visit India for BRICS summit, August 2026.

Reuters, What to know about the Falkland Islands as U.S. considers reassessing position, April 2026.

Reuters/CBS/WSJ reporting on CIA Director John Ratcliffe's August 2026 Moscow visit and subsequent strategic developments.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Difficult Realities of the BRICS' De-dollarization Efforts.

BRICS Council, De-dollarisation in BRICS: Strategic Ambition or Practical Gradualism, 2026.