अझै छ विदेशी खेलको संकेत ? के होला अबको देश ? - CHHA PRASNA

 https://youtu.be/zy3ttpj2I84?si=EwInc4CuceiFkLzj

अहिले मुलुकमा निर्वाचनको विकल्प सोच्ने ठाउँ पनि छैन, – डा. खिमलाल देवकोटा

https://youtu.be/0qiGxews5UI?si=k5EIoiOgcXjzGTFv

The Role of Provincial Assemblies in the Absence of the House of Representatives

The Role of Provincial Assemblies in the Absence of the House of Representatives

Dr. Khimlal Devkota

Member of the Constituent Assembly and Senior Advocate

Introduction

The federal structure of Nepal, as presented by the Constitution of Nepal, established a three-tier system of government: federal, provincial and local. Each tier is constitutionally endowed with legislative, executive and fiscal powers. The bicameral federal legislature, consisting of the House of Representatives and the National Assembly, represents the central legislative body. However, political instability and the frequent dissolution of the House of Representatives have created a vacuum of legislative institutions at the federal level. In such a period, the role of provincial assemblies is important in maintaining the continuity of governance, legislative balance and democratic accountability within the federal framework.

This article explores and discusses the role and moral responsibilities of provincial assemblies in the absence of the House of Representatives in Nepal, including their functions, duties and powers. The exploration and discussion focus on constitutional provisions, intergovernmental coordination and comparative democratic practices. This article argues that provincial assemblies can play both a substitute and a complementary role in preserving democratic momentum and ensuring the efficiency of governance in a federal system.

1. Constitutional Mandate of Provincial Assemblies

Articles 175-195 of the Constitution of Nepal clearly define the formation, powers and functions of provincial assemblies. Each province is established as a unicameral legislative body that exercises the provincial powers listed in Schedule 6, and shares common powers with the Union under Schedule 7. Provincial assemblies are vested with the power to make laws within their constitutional jurisdiction, supervise the work of the provincial executive, approve the provincial budget, maintain checks and balances between the executive and the administration, and represent the interests of citizens at the provincial level. In the absence of the House of Representatives, these functions assume additional moral and political significance as they remain the most active legislative institution directly representing the people.

2. Filling the Democratic Void

When the House of Representatives is dissolved or inoperative, the absence of a directly elected federal legislature creates a vacuum in legislative deliberation, democratic debate and political monitoring, oversight and oversight. Although limited by jurisdiction, provincial assemblies can fill this void in the following ways:

2.1. Strengthening provincial governance:

Provincial assemblies should intensify legislative activity on provincial matters such as education, health, agriculture and local infrastructure so that governance remains people-centric. This prevents a vacuum in democratic processes at the provincial level.

2.2. Ensuring continuity of accountability:

When the federal legislature is inactive, the mechanisms for seeking accountability at the center are weakened. Provincial assemblies can demonstrate democratic vigilance by holding their officials accountable through question-and-answer sessions, special committees and public hearings.

2.3. Public confidence in federalism:

In the absence of a federal legislature, the active work of provincial assemblies strengthens public confidence in Nepal’s federal system, demonstrating that democracy is not a hostage to central instability.

2.3. Legislative innovation and policy continuity

Provincial assemblies can use this period as an opportunity for innovation in the legislative process. They can introduce and refine laws that address provincial needs within constitutional boundaries, such as provincial civil service, education policy, health standards, land management, or tourism promotion. In addition, provincial assemblies can coordinate with local governments to ensure policy continuity and service delivery. Through the Provincial Coordination Council, assemblies can align development priorities, avoid duplication, and ensure that local voices are represented in provincial legislation.

2.4. Promoting cooperative federalism

The absence of a House of Representatives may add to the challenge to the principle of cooperative federalism. However, provincial assemblies can act as a bridge, for example by facilitating dialogue with the provinces and the National Assembly; advocating for fiscal transfers and intergovernmental coordination through the National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission; and passing resolutions urging the federal government to ensure regular service delivery. Provincial assemblies can also take collective initiatives through inter-provincial forums, policy dialogues, and conferences to maintain coherence in the federal system. Such actions reflect a mature federalist ethos, which helps avoid constitutional vacuums.

2.5. Oversight and Monitoring of the Executive Power

In times of federal-level oversight, the risk of executive panic increases. Provincial assemblies should therefore enhance their oversight, monitoring and oversight. This can be done through parliamentary committees; public accounts committees that audit provincial spending; question-and-answer sessions and interpellation motions to ensure ministerial accountability; and debates on policy statements and performance reports. By ensuring transparency at the provincial level, assemblies contribute to a culture of accountability that can influence national governance once the federal legislature resumes.

2.6. Fiscal Responsibility

Fiscal federalism is central to Nepal’s new constitutional order. In times of federal instability, fiscal transfers and conditional grants are at risk of being delayed. Provincial assemblies can play a role in meeting this challenge by implementing provincial revenue laws within constitutional limits, monitoring the use of conditional and matching grants, promoting local tax coordination with local governments, and encouraging efficient financial management and reporting mechanisms. Through budget debates and financial reviews, provincial assemblies can maintain fiscal discipline, which will be crucial to ensuring smooth service delivery to citizens.

2.7. Strengthening local governance relationships

     Local governments are the closest to citizens, and provincial assemblies serve as the legislative link between local and federal governance. In the absence of the House of Representatives, assemblies can engage with local assemblies to promote downward accountability, coordinate developmental and social policies across districts, and facilitate legal clarity where local and provincial mandates overlap; and serve as a platform for conflict resolution in intergovernmental disputes. This vertical coordination ensures that federal instability does not disrupt local governance or development priorities.

3.           Moral and political leadership

Provincial assemblies are not just legislative institutions but symbolic guardians of democracy. Their conduct in the absence of the House of Representatives exemplifies institutional resilience. Provincial leaders, ministers and assembly members should be able to uphold constitutional values, promote inclusiveness, and resist partisan tendencies that may reflect central instability. This moral leadership is necessary to empower provincial assemblies to promote unity, transparency and evidence-based policymaking, while strengthening trust in federal democracy.

4.           Comparative perspectives

The federal experiences of countries such as India, Germany and Ethiopia have shown that provincial legislatures have played an active role in times of national crisis. In India, state assemblies continued the general legislative work during the dissolution of the Lok Sabha, ensuring federal functionality. In Germany, the Länder (state parliaments) coordinate through the Bundesrat to maintain legislative continuity and national stability. Similarly, regional councils in Ethiopia have been able to play a significant role in maintaining governance during times of federal political turmoil. These examples show that active regional legislatures can safeguard democratic governance even when the central legislature is inactive. Nepal’s regional assemblies should learn from these models to maintain constitutional integrity and federalism.

5.           Challenges and Limitations

Despite their potential, regional assemblies face many challenges. For example, reliance on federal law for shared powers; insufficient institutional capacity and weak research support, financial dependence on the federal government; and political centralization, where regional party decisions are dictated by the national leadership. These constraints need to be addressed through legal reform, institutional strengthening, and empowerment of regional secretariat and committee systems.

6.           Conclusion

In Nepal’s evolving federal democracy, it is the constitutional and moral duty of the provincial assemblies to maintain legislative governance and public confidence during the period when the House of Representatives is dissolved. By effectively discharging their legislative, fiscal, and oversight duties, they can maintain democratic momentum and ensure that federalism remains functional and credible. The absence of the House of Representatives should not allow Nepal’s democratic system to fall into a vacuum; rather, it should inspire provincial assemblies and institutions to demonstrate maturity, resilience, and innovation. Active provincial assemblies, guided by constitutional values ​​and a spirit of cooperative federalism, can thus serve as a pillar of stability and a pillar of democratic continuity in times of political uncertainty.

तोकिएकै मितिमा निर्वाचन सम्पन्न गर्नुपर्छ, यसको विकल्प छैन : खिमलाल देवकोटा

तोकिएकै मितिमा निर्वाचन सम्पन्न गर्नुपर्छ, यसको विकल्प छैन : खिमलाल देवकोटा: काठमाडौँ । संविधानविद् एवं नेकपा नेता खिमलाल देवकोटाले तोकिएकै मितिमा निर्वाचन सम्पन्न गर्नुको कुनै विकल्प नरहेको बताएका छन्। उनले निर्वाचनमार्फत

पुरानो राजनीतिले बुझ्न नसकेको नयाँ पुस्ताको सोच

https://www.onlinekhabar.com/2025/11/1801067/the-thinking-of-the-new-generation-that-the-old-politics-cannot-understand 

चुनाव, वैधता र भूराजनीतिक चपेटामा अन्तरिम सरकार

सामाजिक सञ्जाल–आधारित विद्यार्थी/युवा आन्दोलन (जेनजी आन्दोलन) को तीव्र उदयले राजनीतिक संकट उत्पन्न गर्‍यो । दर्जनौंको ज्यान र अरबौंको धनको नाशपछि प्रधानमन्त्रीको राजीनामा र संसद्को विघटन हुँदै सुशीला कार्की नेतृत्वको अन्तरिम सरकार गठन भयो ।

हालको अन्तरिम सरकारलाई नियुक्तिका बखत नै राष्ट्रपतिबाट फागुन २१ मा निर्वाचन गराउने जिम्मेवारी दिइएको छ । यति महत्वको जिम्मेवारी सहित गठन भएको सरकारका कार्यभार के के हुन् ? लेखमा यसबारे चर्चा गरिनेhttps://www.onlinekhabar.com/2025/10/1792095/elections-legitimacy-and-geopolitical-tensions-in-the-interim-governmentछ ।

Finding a New Pathway for Nepali Politics After the "Gen-Z" Revolution

 Finding a New Pathway for Nepali Politics After the "Gen-Z" Revolution

Dr. Khimlal Devkota

Constituent Assembly Member and Senior Advocate

Abstract

In September 2025, countrywide mobilizations of youth on an unprecedented scale—commonly referred to as the "Gen-Z" protests—shook Nepal's political schedule, ousting an incumbent government and leading to an interim government under the leadership of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki. Triggered by a shutdown of social media by the government but based on deeper complaints about corruption, joblessness, and manipulation by elites, the movement brought new models of political mobilization (Discord servers, memes, polls) as well as hope and short-term risks for Nepali democracy. This essay charts the causes and proximate effects of the movement, explores how it has remade political agents and institutions, and grabs practical policy and democratic-reform moments to convert youth energy into lasting democratic change. Keywords: Nepal, Gen Z, youth politics, social media, democratization, anti-corruption

Introduction

Nepal's September 2025 unrest—swiftly branded in media and scholarly discussions as the "Gen-Z" revolution—is a familiar political split within a nation that has endured perpetual instability since the abolition of the monarchy and the implementation of the federal constitution. What started as a huge, youth-dominated protest against the government's shutdown of popular social media sites snowballed into a country-wide protest calling for action against systemic corruption and economic stagnation; within weeks, the incumbent prime minister stepped down, parliament dissolved, and an interim administration took control. This episode is significant not only for short-term political consequences but for what it portends in terms of fresh patterns of mobilization, calls for openness, and possible redefinition of elite–citizen relations within Nepal. (The Guardian). The article aims to craft future politics through the interim government, mandated to hold the election within six months, it is not limited to the government mandate but beyond that.

Background: immediate trigger and deeper drivers

The precipitating cause was an unexpected government move to ban various social media sites—a policy justified by the powers as a preservation of "social harmony" but understood by many Nepali youth as a calculated attack on free speech and online social platforms (TikTok and other apps at the heart of youth cultural life). Protests that erupted on 8–10 September quickly snowballed across Kathmandu and other cities. Brutal military forces' use of live ammunition in some areas, among others, greatly heightened the crisis, with dozens killed and thousands wounded. (TIME). Underneath the catalyst were smoldering grievances: pervasive corruption exposed in high-drama procurement scandals, limited formal-sector employment opportunities for fresh graduates, widespread regional disparities, and the sense that political elites had become tone deaf to citizen demands. These deeper grudges predisposed the country to a sudden and explosive political outburst when an emotive trigger point—online censorship—arose. (The New Humanitarian).

How Gen-Z Mobilized: Technology, Leaderlessness, and Culture

Among the rebellion's unique characteristics was its natively digital structure. Organizers of younger generations employed channels like Discord, meme groups, and short videos of memes going viral to organize, share tactics, and even make decisions online (like through consultative votes on interim leadership actions). By using decentralized digital tools, rapid scaling and mobile coordination were enabled, but made accountability more difficult to impose and negotiate with settled political institutions. Other commentators made comparisons to earlier youth rebellions in the region, but referred to technological progress—Discord's invite-only, low-barrier servers gave a coordination backbone. (Al Jazeera). The movement's relative lack of leadership—no single institutionalized party or leader—was both a strength (widespread legitimacy among disoriented young groups) and a weakness (the challenge of converting street-level fervor into institutional changes).

However, movement leaders were able to attract a people's, anti-corruption icon—former Chief Justice Sushila Karki—who was received as interim prime minister by broad segments of demonstrators and some civil-society players. Her induction and promise to lead reforms and new elections marked the protesters' demand for non-partisan, reputation-driven leadership. (The Diplomat).

Immediate Political Consequences and Institutional Pressure Points

The demonstrations had tangible and glittering results: the removal of the current prime minister, dissolution of parliament, and installation of an interim regime with a clear anti-corruption platform and commitment to hold elections (scheduled in March 2026 by some caretaker officials). These dramatic changes revealed constitutional and institutional fault lines—most significantly on the legality of some executive actions, the president's role in initiating interim appointments, and the ability of security forces and the judiciary to quell mass civil unrest without spilling over into violence. The cost in human life—dozens dead and dozens injured—also brought demands for independent investigations and transitional justice processes. (The Guardian).

Political Parties, Elites, And Reputational Crisis

Establishment parties first panicked to react, and the majority of established leaders were legitimized in popular perception. The crisis revealed a sour reputation deficit: parties that had been in government for decades but did absolutely nothing to address corruption or jobs had their own legitimacy amongst youth voters exhausted. If parties are going to stay in the game, they need to change organizationally (reform internal democracy, advance younger leadership) and substantively (develop solid anti-corruption and job-creating platforms). Not doing so could mean prolonged fragmentation, new youth parties, or repeating cycles of street politics. (The New Humanitarian).

Democratic Renewal Possibilities

Gen-Z's movement has several healthy democratic overhaul possibilities, if leveraged appropriately:

1. Anti-corruption architecture: Strongly autonomous anti-corruption institutions with protected appointment procedures, proper investigation powers, and mandatory public disclosure. The provisional government's anti-corruption commitment presents a political opportunity to enact procedure protection and transparency legislation. (Reuters)

2. Youth representation and institutional channels: Establish formal structures for youth participation—youth consultative councils of statutory consultative status, quota candidates on party lists for youth, and school/university civic discussion programs to develop governance capacities among younger age groups.

3. Digital rights and regulatory reform: Reformulate blanket social-media bans and instead seek a rights-based model for regulation that balances the reduction of harmful content against freedom of expression, notice of takedown notices, and due process for platform censorship. The social-media ban that sparked unrest shows how censorship-oriented policies can create unintended results. (TIME)

4. Transitional justice and reconciliation: Introduce 'clean' and transparent, short-term investigations into protest-linked murders and schemes for reparation where necessary. This is 'key to both legitimacy and de-escalation of cycles of impunity. (ABC)

5. Youth employment economic policy: Coordinate macro and sectoral policies for creating formal employment—invest in youth-potential employment sectors (digital economy, green infrastructure, tourism rebound), introduce internship/apprenticeship streams, and upgrade labor market information systems. Underlying economic grievances need to be addressed as much as political reforms do. (See policy proposals in sections ahead.)

Challenges and Constraints: Why Change Is Likely to Get Stuck

Although the potential is there, strongly embedded constraints are likely to subvert reform possibilities. Strong patron-client networks, a party system in disarticulation, institutional capture by regulatory agencies, and limited new police capacity are the risks. In addition, movement decentralization makes classic bargaining difficult: in the absence of one organizational interlocutor, interim governments cannot negotiate durable agreements, and frustrated factions will again turn to extra-institutional pressure if reform promises are not fulfilled. International actors are no exception to having tough decisions either; foreign assistance to democratic institutions does not need to be read as meddling but ought to contribute to building domestic capacities. (The New Humanitarian).

Policy Roadmap: Pragmatic, Sequenced Reforms

In order to translate the Gen-Z moment into structural renewal, I advise a pragmatic, sequenced policy roadmap for policymakers and civil society: Phase 1 (0–3 months): stabilize and investigate. Independent immediate investigation of killings and conduct of security forces; release interim reports. (ABC). Temporary moratorium on blanket platform bans; establish multi-stakeholder review of digital-policy frameworks. (TIME).

Phase 2 (3–12 months): legislate and capacitate. Enact anti-corruption act enhancing prosecutorial independence and whistle-blower protection. (Reuters). Establish youth representation schemes in party law and electoral regulation; set up youth deliberative forums connected to local authorities.

Phase 3 (12–36 months): economic and institutional transformation. Introduce job-creation stimulus with emphasis on youth-intensive sectors with quantifiable employment goals; connect to vocational training. Overhaul judicial expedition and public procurement openness procedures (open data on significant contracts) to avoid impunity and corrupting incentives.

Throughout, retain strong civil-society oversight and public engagement to ensure continued legitimacy. Translating protests into durable politics: strategic lessons for youth movements for solidarity civil society and Gen-Z activism, three strategic decisions will decide whether achievements endure: 1. Institutional insertion vs. invariable street pressure: Look for hybrid approaches that ally protest with building institutional footholds—start policy platforms, support screened candidates, and engage in public inquiry processes instead of being solely extra-institutional. 2. Organizational capacity building: Invest in governance training, open internal decision rules, and conflict-management; these aid movements to negotiate and hold authorities accountable for their actions. Experience elsewhere indicates that mobilization-capable groups and institutionally literate groups succeed more in passing reforms. (The Diplomat). 3. Coalition politics: Join forces with reformist forces in parties, unions, and profession-based organizations to construct cross-class coalitions which can make laws in parliament and deliver locally.

Conclusion

Nepal's Gen-Z revolution was not an unplanned reaction to a social-media crackdown but a symptom of underlying social and political ill and a sign of how digitally born youth can quickly rebuild political forces. The future is uncertain: the caretaker government and mainstream parties have to hit back with sagacious, timely reforms against corruption and youth employment while Gen-Z actors have to convert street legitimacy into institutional competence. If both handle it, Nepal might move toward new democratic legitimacy and improved governance; otherwise, cycles of repression and unrest may again come back to haunt the country, cementing stability. The next few months—judicial investigations, transitional policy decisions, and the holding of promised elections—will set the course. (The Guardian).

References

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2025, September). From streets to Discord: How Nepal’s Gen Z toppled a government. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org

The Diplomat. (2025, September). What’s driving Nepal’s Gen Z revolution? The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com

The Guardian. (2025, October 11). Concern over slow pace of change in Nepal a month after Gen Z protests. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com

Reuters. (2025, September 19). Nepal’s acting PM Karki promises to ‘rectify’ shortcomings that caused deadly Gen Z protests. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com

Al Jazeera. (2025, September 15). ‘More egalitarian’: Nepal’s Gen Z used gaming app Discord to select PM. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com

The New Humanitarian. (2025, September 18). Fatal Gen Z protests reveal decades of Nepali systemic downfall. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org

Time. (2025). Nepal blocks TikTok, increases control over social media sites. Time. https://time.com

 

Author Note

This piece integrates contemporaneous coverage and initial analysis reported throughout the weeks since the September 2025 unrest. Where feasible, original reporting sources in the leading media and policy think tanks have been utilized; given the speedy flow of developments, readers should go to the latest primary materials (official interim government announcements, judicial hearings, and electoral commission releases) as they come out.

पोस्ट–जेनजी आन्दोलन र भू–राजनीति

पोस्ट–जेनजी आन्दोलन र भू–राजनीति: २७ घण्टामा सरकार परिवर्तन मात्रै हैन राज्यका धरोहर सिंहदरवार, संसद भवन र सर्वोच्च अदालत सहित राष्ट्रपति निवाससमेत ध्वस्त पारेर तहल्का मच्चाएको छ । यो अवधिमा नियमित सुरक्षा संयन्त्रको समर्पण, सेना परिचालन नहुनु, जेलबाट झण्डै १३ हजार कैदी बन्दी निस्केर आगजनी तोडफोड लगायतका अपराधजन्य हर्कत नेपाली समाजले भोग्न बाध्य भयो ।  २२...

A Watershed Political Turnoil: The Gen Z Movement and State Fragility in Nepal

 

The political phenomenon commonly referred to as the "Gen Z movement" is a turning point in Nepal's recent political history. Within a period of merely 27 hours, the nation underwent unprecedented state fragility. The event was characterized by colossal human casualties, with more than seven dozen fatalities, and systematic attacks on key state infrastructures. Symbolically and functionally significant buildings—like Singha Durbar (the secretariat of the federal government), the building of the Federal Parliament, the Supreme Court, Shital Niwas (the Presidential palace), and numerous police stations, private residences, and business buildings—were attacked with arson. The violence resulted in the downfall of the government of the day, the dissolution of parliament, and a radical restructuring of the political order.

 

A significant aspect of the crisis was the immobilization of the state's coercive machinery. Law enforcement agencies were visibly ineffective, and the national army was substantially non-functional until the crisis had spiraled beyond management. The eventual dominance of the military into the political arena was symbolically signaled by the Chief of Army Staff speaking to the nation in front of a backdrop that had a portrait of King Prithvi Narayan Shah. The fact that subsequent negotiations with movement representatives were conducted at the military headquarters further underscored the institution's authoritative involvement in civilian political processes.

 

In the midst of this institutional vacuum, the then Prime Minister offered his resignation, which was formally accepted by the President under a disputed clause allowing him to stay on in a caretaker capacity. During this interregnum, the executive fell under the custody of the national army, highlighting the complete breakdown of traditional constitutional safeguards. Political violence swelled, including a physical assault on former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and his wife, Dr. Arju Rana Deuba. Live broadcast of these events contributed to a general climate of fear and political disorientation. In a further violation of constitutional convention, the ex-Chief Justice Sushila Karki was appointed Prime Minister and, in conjunction with the army, enforced a nationwide curfew.

 

The crisis excited intense regional interest, with the security forces of a neighboring country expressing a willingness to intervene at the formal request of the government. Internally, the army's conditional support to the civilian government—such as offering helicopter evacuation only after it was ensured that the Prime Minister would resign—demonstrated the role of the military as a political arbiter. Negotiations, conducted under heavy military surveillance at Shital Niwas, involved political party leaders virtually acting as delegates under the control of the army. Military leadership expressly threatened that withdrawal would be the consequence of a collapse of political consensus, graphically illustrating the conditional nature of state power.

 

Party leaders, imprisoned for ten days amid constitutional violations and dissolution of parliament, subsequently negotiated in characteristically anachronistic terms. For instance, policy documents presented to the Maoist party's central committee did not have any content reference to the Gen Z movement or to the new political reality. The meeting degenerated into classic intra-party factionalism between leaders Prachanda, Prakash, and Prabhakar, rather than a critical analysis of the structural break. The debate was characterized by rhetorical glorification and demonization, a profound departure from the party's professed ideals of dialectical debate.

 

This analytical failure reflects a broader political stagnation. Constitutionally, the last period was already marred by grave irregularities. The formation of the UML-Congress alliance government under Article 76(2) of the constitution was followed by failure to secure a vote of confidence. Rather than invoking Article 76(3) to swear in the leader of the largest party, a new government was sworn in under 76(2) through coercive means, including threats to the President and the judiciary. Judicial review was effectively staved off, as writ petitions were dismissed without process, and the Election Commission refused to accept intra-party expulsions. This political engineering, initially aimed at power consolidation for KP Sharma Oli, was also followed by a sharp geopolitical reorientation. Oli's alignment with U.S. strategic interests, as typified by his push for the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, was in congruence with his assertion of freedom from Indian influence, as exemplified by the re-fueling of boundary controversies regarding Kalapani and Lipulekh.

 

The Gen Z movement, however vocalized as a reaction against corruption and social media restrictions, happened in the context of this institutional logjam and geopolitical maneuvering. That it happened opens up the risk of instrumentalization by actors who want to generate political instability and project Nepal as a failed state. The silence of democracy's guardians—the absence of court challenges to the parliament's dissolution, the compromised judiciary, and a comatose civil society—only underlines the depth of the crisis.

 

Regionally, the Nepali developments appear in consonance with broader patterns of transnational political realignment apparent in South Asia, replicating experiments in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. That suggests that the crisis is not merely a domestic problem but is an aspect of a broader assault on democratic norms, part of a global pattern of populist destabilization and institutional erosion. It is in this somber context that the inability of Nepal's political parties, and the Maoists most of all, to update their analytical paradigms from decades-old intra-party rivalries highlights a fundamental disconnect between the magnitude of external structural change and the stagnation of domestic political discourse. This intellectual and political complacency renders the polity extremely susceptible to internal collapse as well as external manipulation.

 

 

Gen Z Movement

 

g]kfndf h]GhL cfGbf]ng eof] . @& 306fsf] cGt/fndf ^ bh{geGbf j9Lsf] Hofg uof], /fHosf w/f]x/x? l;+xb/jf/, ;+;b ejg, ;jf]{Rr cbfnt, lztn lgjf; nufot s}og\ k|x/L rf}sL, s}og lghL lgjf; / Jofkfl/s k|lti7fgx? v/fgL jg] . ;/sf/ 9Nof] . gof ;/sf/ jGof] . ;+;b lj36g eof] . Ps lx;fjn] lkmlndsf] sxfgL h:t} eof] . k|x/Ln] xft v'66f 5f]l8lbof] . olt x'bf;Dd ;]gf kl/rfng klg ePg . klxnf]k6s ;]gfkltn] k[YjL gf/fo0f zfxsf] tl:j/ k[i7e'lddf /fv]/ b]zjf;Lsf gfddf ;+jf]wg ug{' eof] . h]GhL k|ltlglwx?;+u ;}Go x]8Sjf6/df jftf{ ug'{ eof] . k|wfgdGqLsf] gfd ef]ln ljxfg !!jh];Dd k]z ug'{ eGg] dfOls8= klg ;]gfjf6} eof] .

olt x'bf;Dd k|wfgdGqLsf] /flhgfdf cfPsf] 5 . /flhgfdf :jLs[t e} csf]{ ;/sf/ gjGbf;Dd sfo{ef/ ;dfnL/xg /fi6|kltsf] kq klg ;fj{hlgs ePsf] 5 . ;+ljwfg t s]lk cf]nL sfd rnfP ;/sf/sf] k|wfgdGqL g} 5g\ t/ oltj]nf;Dd k|wfgdGqL / dGqLx? ;]gfsf] ;'/Iffdf 5g\ . k'j{ k|wfgdGqL z]/ jxfb'/ b]pjf / pgsL wd{kTgL 8f cf/h' b]pjf-jxfnjfnf k//fi6|dGqL_ dfly ;f+3flts cfs|d0f ePsf] 5 . oL ;j} 36gfx? nfOe k|;f/0f u/]/ Ps k|sf/sf] cft+s k|;f/ ul/Psf] 5 . PsfPs z'lznf sfsL{ k|wfgdGqL lgo'Qm x'g] k|s[of ;+u} ;]gfjf6} skmo{" nufpg] sfd ePsf] 5 .

l5d]sL d'n'ssf] ;'/Iff clwsf/Ln] xfdL tof/L xfntdf 5f} dfu x'gf;fy xfdL cfp5f} eGg] s'/f klg ;fj{hlgs ;+rf/ dfWoddf cfPsf] 5 . k|wfgdGqLn] /flhgfdf glbO ;'/Iff / ;'/lIft cjt/0fsfnflu x]lnsK6/ k7fpg klg ;lsGg eGg] ;]gfsf] hjfkm 5 . /flhgfdf lbP dfq} ;'/Iffsfnflu x]lnsK6/ cfpg] jfrf 5 . jftf{ ;}Go x]8Sjf6/jf6 lztnlgjf; ;5{ hxf bnsf g]tfx? k|ltlglwd'ns ?kdf pkl:yt x'G5g\ . ;}Go 3]/fdf /x]sf g]tfx?nfO{ ;]gfn] g} Toxf pkl:yt u/fp5 . er'{jn dfWodjf6 sfd rnfp k|wfgdGqLsf] ;xdlt lnOG5 . of]hgf d'tfljs ;xdlt hgfpg'; cGoyf xfd|f] xftjf6 km'lTsG5 / ;]gfnfO{ Jofs ug'{ kg]{ x'G5 eGg] ;]gfkltsf] s'/f cfp5 .

em08} !) lbg g]tfx? ;]gfsf] cfO;f]n]zgdf j:5g\ . kmf]g ;Dks{ s;}nfO{ ug{ lbOPsf] 5}g . ;+ljwfg ldlrPsf] 5 . ;+;b lj36g ePsf] 5 . /fhf Nofpg] xNnf 5 . nf]stGq t sf]dfdf uPsf] 5 . o:tf] k[i7e'lddf j;]sf] kf6L{sf] s]lGb|o ;ldltdf tLgj6f b:tfj]h 5nkmnsf nflu k]z ePsf 5g\ t/ pk/f]Qm k[i7e'ldsf] s'/f s'g} klg b:tfj]hdf cfpb}g . cWoIfsf] b:tfj]h jfrg ubf{s} jvt k|i6ofpg] sf]lz; x'G5 ls o; k6ssf] b:tfj]hdf /fli6|o kl/l:ylt cGt/fli6|o kl/l:ylt h:tf k/Dk/fut s'/f n]lvPg . w/ftnLo oyfy{sf] cf+sng ljgfsf b:tfj]hdf 5nkmn u/L b'O lbg] s]lGb|o ;ldltsf] j}7s ;lsof] .

hgo'4 kl5sf] ;+;b / ;+ljwfg;efsf] jx;df of] d'n'sdf hgo'4 ePs} lyPg h;/L sf+u|]; Pdfn]x? s'/f uy]{ xfdLnfO{ slG;/L tft]/ cfpYof] 7Ls To;} u/L kf6L{sf] b:tfj]h / jx; To:t} eof] dflglnp efb| @# / @$ ut] d'n'sdf s]xL ePs} lyPg . h]GhL cfGbf]ng ePs} lyPg . clg kf6L{ leqsf] jx; k|r08sf] kIfdf ls gf/fo0fsfhL jf k|efs/sf] kIfdf eGg] 6fpsf] uGg] sfd jfx]s s]xL x'b}g . k|r08nfO{ b]jTjs/0f / k|sfz / k|efs/nfO{ bfgjLs/0f ug{df clwsf+zsf] ;do ljTof] . cfp6 ckm lb jS; ;f]Rg], / cfnf]rgfTds ;f]r d[t k|fo e};s]sf] /x]5 t}klg 4GbjfbL, dfcf]jfbL / ef}ltsjfbL eGg] bfjL oyfjt 5 .

o:tf] kl/l:yltdf ;DkGg s]lGb|o ;ldltsf] j}7sdf cfkm'nfO{ dfOGo'6 n]vgsf] lhDdf lyof] . s;n] s] jf]n] eGg] jf/]df gf]6 ug'{ lyof] . To;}n] o;k6s klg jf]lnPg . d jf:tjdf ltgj6} b:tfj]h ck'0f{ 5g\ . w/ftnLo oyfy{sf] cf+sng gu/L n]lvPsf b:tfj]h xfjfdf t}l/Psf5g\ . ltgsf] 6]Sg] cfwf/ 5}g . cyf{t s'g cfwf/df tL b:tfh]h tof/ ePsf x'g < kf6L{sf] cf+sng s] xf] </fli6|o / cGt/fli6|o kl/l:ylt s:tf] 5 < o:tf] kl/l:ytdf kf6Ln] cjnDjg ug]{ sfo{ef/ s] xf] < eGg] jf/]df ;xL lbzf lgb]{z ug]{ oltj]nfsf] d'Vo sfo{ef/ x'GYof] Tof] sfd o; k6s x'g ;s]g . k|Zg ;f]Wg] lxDdt klg s;}n] u/]g .

o;sf] k5fl8 g]tfx? jf]Ng 8/fPsf 5g\ . of t g]tfx? j]vj/ 5g\ . of t vj/ kfP/ klg ljZn]if0f ug{ cf+6 u/]sf 5}gg\ .

hjls Pdfn] sf+u|];sf] u7jGwg ;+ljwfgsf] wf/f &^-@_cGtu{t jg]sf] lyof] . hjls &^-@_ sf] k|wfgdGqLn] ljZjf;sf] dt k|fKt ug{ g;s]kl5 :jtM &^-#_ cGtu{t ;+;bsf] ;j}eGbf 7'nf] bnsf] g]tfnfO{ k|wfgdGqLdf lgo'Qm ug'{ kYof]{ . To;f] ul/Pg . /fi6|kltnfO{ b'O{ ltxfO{ b]vfP/ wDsfP/ o;f] gu/] dxfcleof]u / cbfntnfO{ klg b'O{ ltxfO{ b]vfP/ t;f{P/ o;df bfofjfof u/] dxfcleof]u eg]/ Tof] sfd ul/Psf] lyof] . cGttM /fi6|klt klg jfWo x'g'eof] . cbfntdf ;f] l/6 btf{;Dd klg ePg b/lk7 eof] . km]l/ j]Grdf uPg . o:tf] k[i7e'lddf jg]sf] ;/sf/ d}dQ ePs} lyof] . k|r08sf] ;/sf/ 9fn]/ b]pjfsf] ;/sf/ jgfpg] w]on] of] sfd ePsf] ePtfklg b]pjfn] cf/h' nufotsf sf08 jrfpg] zt{df s]lk cf]nL nfO{ ls:tLdf /fv]/ k|wfgdGqL lbPsf lyP . cj tf]lsPsf] lhDdf cyf{t cf/h' hf]ufpg] sfd u/] kl5 jfsL dgk/L ug{ kfpg' kg]{] s]kL cf]nLsf] bfjL Jojxf/df k|i6 b]lvGYof] .

s]lk cf]nL b'O ltxfOsf] g]skfsf] ;/sf/ x'bfsf jvt g} ef/tn] uGg 5f8]sf], lrgn] gkTofPsf] emf]sdf cd]l/sfsf] njLdf k|j]z ul/;s]sf lyP . To;} sf/0f Pd l; l; kl/of]hgf ;+;bjf6 kfl/t u/fpg] jfrf pgs} lgb]{zgdf pgs} ljZjf;kfq cy{dGqLn] u/]sf lyP To;sf] rfhf]kfhf] ldnfpg] sfd cd]l/sfsf tTsflng /fhb'tn] u/]sf lyP . cd]l/sf bfOgf 5 eGg] pgnfO{ k/]sf sf/0f b'O b'O k6s ;+;b e+u ug]{ sfd klg u/]sf x'g . ;+ljwfg ljkl/tsf] sfd kf6L{nfO{ ;f]Wb} g;f]wL u/]sf sf/0f pgnfO{ x6fpg] u/L ljz]if clwj]zg jf]nfpg vf]hbf pgs} k[o kfq /fi6|klt ePsf sf/0f Tof] klg ;+ej ePsf] lyPg . kf6L{jf6 lg:sfzg u/]sf] ljj/0f lgjf{rg cfof]udf j'emfpg vf]Hbf pgs} k[o kfq k|d'v lgjf{rg cfo'Qmn] /2Lsf] 6f]s/Ldf kmflnlbPsf sf/0fn] Tof] klg ;+ej ePsf] lyPg .

ToxL kl/l:ylt oltj]nf bf]xf]l/Psf] lyof] . ef/tn] Ps jif{ ljTbf;Dd klg lgDgf u/]sf] lyPg . To;sf] jbnf lng jf/Djf/ lrg uPsf lyP . lrgsf] :jtGqtf lbj;sf] ;Gbe{df lrgn] /fi6|kltnfO{ lgDtf u/]sf] lyof] . pgL pQ/ sf]l/of, ?; O/fg ;d]tsf g]tf hfg] d+r z]o/ ug{ kg]{ ePsfn] ef/t / cd]l/sf l/;fpg] ;+efjgf b]v]/ hfg OGsf/ u/] . o;} df}sfdf /GylgPsf cf]nL cfkm' hfg] eP . t/ k//fi6|dGqL cf/h' eg] e|d0f 6f]lndf ;dfj]z lyOgg\ . ptf lrgn] g]kfn lrgsf] lhP;cfO -Unf]j/ ;]s'/L6L Olgl;ol6e_ df ;xefuL x'g] eof] eg]/ lj1KtL lgsfNof] . x'g} nfu]sf] e|d0f /2 ePsf sf/0fn] s'|4 cf]nLn] lrgdf 5+b} sfnfkfgL lnk'n]ssf] s'/f p7fP . sfnfkfgL lnk'n]ssf] eGbf klg lhP;cfOdf g]kfnsf] ;dy{g cd]l/sf / ef/t b'j}nfO{ ;}Xo ePg . o;}sf] kl/0ffd lgs} klxnfb]lv tof/L ul/Psf] ljifo sfof{Gjog ug]{ r/0fdf jfxo zlQm k'u] eGg] lgisif{ x'g kb{Yof] . ;]gfkltn] klg lrgsf] e|d0f /2 u/]/ jftf{ ;Djfbdf Jo:t ePsf lyP . oL ;j} sf/0fn] cj s]lk cf]nLsf] ;/sf/ lu/fpg] Psdfq} jf6f] h]GhL cfGbf]ng jgfOPsf] lyof] . h]GhL cfGbf]ngn] e|i6frf/sf] lj/f]w / ;fdflhs ;+hfndflysf] k|ltjGb km's'jfsf] dfq} dfu u/]sf] lyof] . oxL dfu / df}sfdf 3';k}7 u/fP/ c/fhstf dRrfP/ ;'/Iff c+unfO{ /ldt] jgfP/ c;kmn /fi6| jgfP/ of] xs{t ePsf] lyof] eGg] s'/f lbgsf] 3fd em} 5n{u 5 . nf]stGq / ;+ljwfgjfbsf] s'/f ug]{x? of] xs{tnfO{ lj/f]w ug{ g;s]/ r'Kk 5g\ . ;+;b lj36g x'gf;fy bh{gf} l/6 kg]{ d'n'sdf cfh;Dd l/6 k/]sf] 5}g . l/6 k/] klg ;}Go lx/f;tjf6 lg:s]sf s'g} klg GofowLz To;nfO{ cGoyf ug]{ cj:yfdf 5}gg . ;}Go lx/f;tjf6 lg:s]sf g]tfsf sfo{stf{ jlsnx? Klg Tof] lxDdt ul//x]sf 5}gg .

l8k :6]6sf] of]hgf hxf cd]l/sfsf] lvnkmdf ;/sf/ 5 To;nfO{ kfNg] of]hgfdf cf/De ul/Psf] sn/ l/ef]n'zgsf] kl/If0f blIf0f Plzofdf j+unfb]z / >Ln+sf kl5 g]kfndf ePsf] 5 . o:tf] k|of]u k'jL{ o'/f]ksf d'n'sx?df w]/} cl3 b]lv x'b} cfPsf] lyof] . cd]l/sfdf 8f]gfN8 6|Dkn] kl/eflift u/]sf] nf]stGq cj ;+;f/ e/L / g]kfndf ;d]t cEof; x'b}5 . To;}sf] 5gs ;j} kf6L{sf j}7sdf b]vf kg]{5 . dfcf]jfbL kf6L{n] b'O{ lbg] s]lGb|o ;ldltsf] j}7s u/]/ To;sf] 5gs b]vfO;s]sf] 5 . jfXo kl/l:ylt olt u+le/ ePsf jvt kf6L{ leqsf] cfGtl/s jx; b'O bzs k'/fg} b]Vbf bof nfu]/ cfof] . To;}n] jf]Ng] hfFu/ nfu]g .